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Arrow Award

iHEA’s Kenneth J. Arrow Award was created to recognize excellence in the field of health economics with the Award presented to the author(s) of the paper judged to be the best paper published in health economics in English in the award year. The Award was set up in honor of Kenneth Arrow and in recognition of the influence of his seminal paper from 1963 “Uncertainty and the welfare economics of medical care”. Professor Arrow was involved in the creation of the Award and he presented the inaugural prize in 1993.

The Award is made every year. Each year the Award committee consider a short-list of up to ten papers, with each paper evaluated by all of the committee members in terms of importance and originality of contribution, appropriateness and innovation in methodology and clarity of presentation.

The winner is presented with a plaque at the iHEA congress when held in the same year as the award, or at a special reception at the AEA conference in years when there is no iHEA congress.

Call for Nominations 
Deadline: January 18, 2019

Nominations for the Arrow Award from members of iHEA are welcome and should be sent to the Chair of the Committee (Christopher J. Ruhm: by a copy of the paper and a brief cover letter. The deadline for submissions is January 18, 2019. 

Most recent Award Winner

 Arrow Award Honours Research on Ex Post Adverse Selection in Health Care

The 26th Arrow Award for the best paper in health economics is awarded to Marika Cabral for her paper “Claim Timing and Ex Post Adverse Selection” Review of Economic Studies 84(1): 1-44, January 2017.

The Arrow Award Committee is proud to acknowledge the author of this innovative and policy-relevant paper which uses detailed U.S. dental claims data from a large multinational manufacturing company to examine the effect of strategic treatment delays – a source of ex postadverse selection – on insurance enrollment and consumer welfare. Reduced-form estimates indicate the importance of strategic treatment delays and structural estimates are used to analyze the effects of this strategic behavior. Approximately 40% of individuals are estimated to strategically delay claims from one year to the next, when they have incentives to do so. The resulting ex postadverse selection is associated with 61% lower insurance enrolment and 15% lower per capita consumer welfare than in an equilibrium with only traditional (ex ante) adverse selection. Reducing the frequency of open enrolment periods could substantially improve welfare and ex post adverse selection is one reason why dental coverage is relatively rare in the U.S., does not cover the largest risks and often limits coverage for pre-existing conditions.

Marika Cabral, Ph.D., is an Assistant Professor of Economics at the University of Texas at Austin and a Faculty Research Fellow at the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER). She obtained her Ph.D. in economics from Stanford University in 2011 and she obtained her B.A. in economics and applied mathematics from the University of California San Diego in 2006. Her research covers a range of topics in health economics and public finance. Much of her recent research focuses on understanding the role of asymmetric information and the impact of government intervention in health (and health-related) insurance markets.


Committee Membership 2019

Membership of the Arrow Award Committee is refreshed each year and members can serve for up to two three-year terms.

Chair: Christopher Ruhm, University of Virginia, USA
Co-Chair: Luigi Siciliani, University of York, UK


Term Expires at the end of 2019:

Joan Costa-i-Font, London School of Economics, UK
*Brigitte Dormont, Université Paris Dauphine, France
*Kate Ho, Columbia University, USA
*Jui-fen Rachel Lu, Chang Gung University, Taiwan
Rodrigo R. Soares, Columbia University, USA


Term Expires at the end of 2020:

*Jonathan Kolstad, University of California, Berkeley, USA
Manoj Mohanan, Duke University, USA
Heidi Williams, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, USA
*Joachim Winter,  Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Germany
*Winnie Yip, Harvard University, USA


Term Expires at the end of 2021:

*Jeffrey Clemens, University of California San Diego, USA
Luke Connelly, University of Queensland, Australia
*Joshua Gottlieb, University of British Columbia, Canada
Karine Lamiraud, ESSEC, France
Peter Smith, Imperial College, UK

(* = 2nd and final term)




Winning Paper





Martin Gaynor, Carol Propper, and Stephan Seiler. 2016. Free to choose? Reform, choice and consideration sets in the English National Health Service. American Economic Review 106(11): 3521-3557.



Eric Budish, Benjamin N. Roin and Heidi Williams. 2015. Do firms underinvest in long-term research? Evidence from cancer clinical trials.American Economic Review105(7): 2044-2085.



Jeffrey Clemens and Joshua D. Gottlieb. 2014. Do Physicians' Financial Incentives Affect Treatment Patterns and Patient Health? American Economic Review104(4): 1320-49.



Jonathan T. Kolstad. 2013. Information and quality when motivation is intrinsic: evidence from surgeon report cards. American Economic Review,103(7):2875-2910.



Amy Finkelstein, Sarah Taubman, Bill Wright, Mira Bernstein, Jonathan Gruber, Joseph P. Newhouse, Heidi Allen, Katherine Baicker, and the Oregon Health Study Group. 2012. The Oregon Health Insurance Experiment: Evidence from the First Year. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 127(3):1057-1106



Randall D. Cebul, James B. Rebitzer, Lowell J. Taylor, Mark E. Votruba. 2011. Unhealthy Insurance Markets: Search Frictions and the Cost and Quality of Health Insurance. American Economic Review,101(5):1842-71



Carol Propper and John Van Reenen. 2010. Can pay regulation kill? Panel Data Evidence on the Effect of Labor Markets on Hospital Performance. Journal of Political Economy, 118(2): 222-273



Kate Ho. 2009. Insurer-Provider Networks in the Medical Care Market. American Economic Review,99(1):393-430



Hanming Fang, Michael P. Keane, and Dan Silverman. 2008. Sources of Advantageous Selection: Evidence from the Medigap Insurance Market. Journal of Political Economy, 116(2): 303-350.



Amitabh Chandra and Doug Staiger. 2007. Productivity Spillovers in Health Care: Evidence from the Treatment of Heart Attacks. Journal of Political Economy, 115: 103-140.



Kevin M. Murphy and Robert H. Topel. 2006. The Value of Health and Longevity. Journal of Political Economy, 114(5): 871-904.



Gary S. Becker, Tomas J. Philipson, and Rodrigo R. Soares. 2005. The Quantity and Quality of Life and the Evolution of World Inequality. American Economic Review, 95(1):277-291



Edward Miguel and Michael Kremer. 2004. Worms: Identifying impacts on education and health in the presence of treatment externalities. Econometrica, 72(1); 159-217.



Kenneth Chay and Michael Greenstone. 2003. The Impact of Air Pollution on Infant Mortality: Evidence from Geographic Variation in Pollution Shocks Induced by a Recession. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118(3):1121-1167.



Anne Case, Darren Lubotsky and Christina Paxson. 2002. Economic Status and Health in Childhood: The Origins of the Gradient. American Economic Review; 92(5): 1308-1334.



Willard G. Manning and John Mullahy. 2001. Estimating Log Models: To Transform or Not to Transform? Journal of Health Economics, 20(4): 461–494



David M. Cutler, Mark McClellan and Joseph P. Newhouse. 2000. How Does Managed Care Do It? Rand Journal of Economics, 31(3): 526–548



Will Dow, Tomas J. Philipson and Xavier Sala-i-Martin. 1999. Longevity Complementarities Under Competing Risks. American Economic Review,89(5):1358-1371.



Donna B. Gilleskie. 1998. A Dynamic Stochastic Model of Medical Care Use and Work Absence. Econometrica, 66(1): 1-45.



Ching-To Albert Ma and Thomas G. McGuire. 1997. Optimal Health Insurance and Provider Payment. American Economic Review,87(4): 685-704.



Daniel Kessler and Mark McClellan. 1996. Do Doctors Practice Defensive Medicine? Quarterly Journal of Economics, 111(2): 353-390.



Martin Gaynor and Paul Gertler. 1995. Moral Hazard and Risk Spreading in Partnerships. RAND Journal of Economics, 26(4): 591-613.



Jonathan Gruber. 1994. The Incidence of Mandated Maternity Benefits. American Economic Review, 84(3): 622-641



Phillip Cook and Michael Moore. 1993. Drinking and schooling. Journal of Health Economics, 12(4): 411-429.



Richard Hirth. 1992. Nursing Home Quality: Roles of Information and Ownership (Unpublished paper)


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The International Health Economics Association was formed to increase communication among health economists, foster a higher standard of debate in the application of economics to health and health care systems, and assist young researchers at the start of their careers.

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